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ABSTRACT 
Traditionally, courts have applied a “customary practice” 
standard in determining the legal standard of care in medical 
malpractice cases. Recently, a few courts have abandoned this 
dated standard and instead applied a Daubert analysis to the 
standard of care, which focuses on medical evidence that is 
scientifically based . In light of these recent holdings, this iBrief 
argues that with the increasing amounts of technologies 
improving evidence-based medicine, the customary practice 
standard is no longer a useful or appropriate test for 
determining the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. 
By applying a Daubert analysis to an expert’s testimony on the 
standard of care, the testimony becomes a scientifically based 
testimony rather than an expert’s notion of what is common 
practice in the medical profession.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Recent split circuit court decisions signal a tension regarding 
expert testimony in the area of medical malpractice.  The issue is 
whether the legal standard of care should be determined by expert 
opinion informed by personal experience or informed by scientific 
evidence.2  Exclusive reliance on physician experience was justified 
when there was no other information available, but new technology has 
significantly improved research, allowing medicine to become 
increasingly evidence-driven.3  The introduction of such nascent 
technology raises the question: Should physicians be allowed to testify 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2007, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in English, 2004, 
University of Virginia. The author would like to thank Clark Havighurst for 
presenting this issue and offering insight on the topic.  All errors and 
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2 See Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice 
Standard of Care: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 821, 823 (2002) (describing why health services research, such 
as clinical practice guidelines, chart review studies, and physician surveys, are 
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about medical malpractice without taking modern medical technology 
into account?  
¶2 In many professions technology provides powerful information 
helping to advance the field.  Therefore, as technology facilitates the 
growth of accessible medical information, it only seems natural that 
physicians would utilize such information when determining how to treat 
a patient.  Yet, this is not the case.  Today, most states permit physicians 
to be protected by a customary standard designed by physicians.  In order 
to help initiate change, courts should hold physicians accountable for 
knowing and incorporating modern medical information into the 
physician’s method for treating a patient.  Therefore, this iBrief argues 
that in light of increasing amounts of technology providing better 
information on medicine, customary practice is no longer an appropriate 
test in evaluating a physician’s expert testimony and instead should be 
replaced with a Daubert analysis.  
¶3 The first part of this iBrief is an introduction to the elements 
necessary for establishing medical malpractice.  Part II of this iBrief 
explores the weaknesses of a customary practice standard.  Part III 
describes how a Daubert analysis would be applied to determining the 
medical  standard of care.  Part IV of this iBrief specifically discusses the 
differences between a customary practice standard and a standard that 
applies a Daubert analysis.  Part V of this iBrief shows how a Daubert 
analysis is compatible with the emerging reasonable physician standard.  
Finally, Part VI of this iBrief discusses why applying a Daubert analysis 
to the standard of care does not create a standard of care that is too 
demanding for physicians. 
I. ESTABLISHING A CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY 
¶4 To establish a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must 
show the following elements: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) 
breach of that standard of care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4) 
proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury.4  In 
ordinary negligence cases, the standard of care is the degree of care that a 
reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have exercised when in 
the defendant’s situation or a similar circumstance.5 However, for 
medical malpractice, the standard of care is determined by looking at the 
“degree of skill, care and learning which is possessed and exercised by 
members of the medical profession in good standing.”6  The 
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conventional justification for the medical-custom standard is that lay 
decision makers are more capable of determining what physicians 
actually do than what physicians should do.7  Moreover, it would be 
difficult for a layman to determine what a doctor should have done 
without having any knowledge of the profession.   Therefore, in medical 
malpractice cases, expert witnesses testify as to what the appropriate 
standard of care should be.   
¶5 An example of a medical malpractice case where experts 
testified to the standard of care without using a Daubert analysis is 
Kramer v. Milner.8  There, an action was brought against the defendant 
for negligently failing to recommend or order a screening mammogram 
for the decedent who died from breast cancer.9  According to the 
defendant’s expert, the defendant was not negligent even though the 
decedent was over fifty and the decedent’s sister had passed away from 
breast cancer.10   He stated that, because of the decedent’s age (seventy), 
family history diminished in importance.  Moreover, the decedent did not 
complain about her breast during the three years she was treated by the 
defendant.11  Meanwhile, the plaintiff’s expert testified that the standard 
of care required that an annual mammogram to be ordered for any 
woman over fifty if her mother or sister had breast cancer.12  The 
plaintiff’s expert based this testimony on medical guidelines followed by 
over eighty percent of physicians and suggested that, by not following 
the guidelines, the defendant violated the standard of care.13  In response, 
the defendant’s expert testified that the guidelines were merely 
recommendations or suggestions.14 Ultimately, a jury decides which 
expert is accurately determining the standard of care.15  Therefore, final 
decisions are often made without considering a Daubert analysis even 
though the Daubert test was created to shed light on Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 , which governs expert testimony in federal courts.16  
¶6 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.17 Daubert 
                                                     
7 Catherine T. Struve, Doctors the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in 
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 978 (2004). 
8 Kramer v. Milner, 639 N.E.2d 157, 158–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
9  Id. at 158. 
10 Id. at 159. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 158. 
13 Id. at 158–59.  
14 Id. at 159. 
15 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 328C(b).  
16 FED. R. EVID. 702.  
17 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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expressly covers expert testimony in federal courts, but it does not 
necessarily apply to expert testimony in state courts. Because Daubert 
only applies in federal courts, state courts are not obligated to apply 
Daubert to an expert’s testimony on the standard of care.   However, 
states can adopt Daubert’s standard for admissibility of expert 
testimony.18  
¶7 In Daubert, the Supreme Court created a test for the 
admissibility of expert opinion.19  Daubert held that trial judges should 
determine “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”20  Daubert’s 
two-step inquiry requires trial judges to assess the relevance and 
reliability of the expert’s testimony.21  According to the Sixth Circuit, the 
relevance requirement makes certain that there is a proper “fit” between 
the expert’s testimony and the matter to be resolved at trial.22 The 
reliability prong focuses on the methodology and the principles 
underlying the testimony.23 Daubert suggested four factors in assessing 
reliability: (1) the ability to test the opinion; (2) peer review and 
publication; (3) potential rate of error; and (4) general acceptance in the 
relevant scientific community.24  Such a test permits judges to exclude 
expert testimonies based on junk science.  
II. THE WEAKNESSES OF USING THE CUSTOMARY-CARE STANDARD 
WHEN DETERMINING THE STANDARD OF CARE 
¶8 There are significant downfalls in determining the standard of 
care by solely looking at customary practice. First, there may be no 
customs in a world where there are various medical options for the same 
problem.  Second, custom itself may be negligent.  Third, experts 
(sometimes referred to as the “hired guns”) may be biased and provide 
unreliable testimony.  Fourth, customary practice permits an inefficient 
medical system to remain at odds with emerging evidence-based 
medicine.  
¶9 First, not even physicians agree on customary care in particular 
cases, suggesting that a singular custom oftentimes does not exist.  The 
standard of care for medical malpractice cases must be proven by expert 
                                                     
18 Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Ky. 2004).  
19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 
20  Id. at 592–93; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151–52 
(1999) (broadening gate-keeping obligations to all experts). 
21 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–93. 
22  See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 555 (6th Cir. 1993). 
23 Id. at 556. 
24 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
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testimony outlining the prevailing medical custom.25  These physician 
expert witnesses are asked to explain what is ordinarily done in 
circumstances similar to the issue of concern, but it is unclear how these 
physicians know what is ordinarily done.26  In fact, they may simply be 
explaining what they would have done and assume that it is what other 
physicians would have done as well.27 
¶10 When the testimony involves areas with no agreement on the 
standards of practice, a jury is likely to hear mutually exclusive 
testimonies. This is not to suggest that there should be only one standard 
of practice,28 but rather that one custom does not exist.  This should not 
be surprising considering science often leads to dissimilar scientific 
conclusions and physicians will respond to these various conclusions 
differently. Moreover, the growth of technology has increased a 
physician’s possible alternatives for treating a patient.29  Having a 
variety of caretaking approaches for the same medical condition makes it 
even more difficult to identify a medical custom because it is unlikely 
that just one custom even exists.30 
¶11 The controversy of whether a customary practice exists was 
illustrated by the Kramer case where the plaintiff’s expert felt that the 
American Cancer Society’s recommendation (annual mammograms for 
women over fifty if there is a family history of cancer) was the standard 
of care because it was customary to follow their suggestions.31 
Meanwhile, the defendant’s expert felt that, because there were several 
guidelines with different recommendations, there was no uniform 
guideline for practitioners.32    
¶12 Second, the custom itself may be a negligent standard of care.33 
Normally, customary practice is not conclusive evidence of what the 
standard of care is, but in medical malpractice cases, custom is typically 
                                                     
25 John W. Ely et al., Determining the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice: 
the Physician’s Perspectives, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 864–65 (2002). 
26 Id. at 865.  
27 Id. 
28 HAVIGHURST supra note 4, at 1030 (arguing that reconciling scientific 
disputes is not in the public interest and is possibly an anti-trust violation). 
29  HAVIGHURST, supra note 4, at 1013 (citing Henderson & Siciliano, Universal 
Health and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Malpractice, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1389–91(1994)). 
30 HENDERSON & SICILIANO, supra note 29, at 1390–91. 
31  Kramer v. Milner, 639 N.E.2d 157, 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
32 Id. at 159. 
33 Paula Sweeney, Medical Malpractice Expert Testimony in Texas, 41 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 517, 525 (2000). 
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the exclusive measure of due care.34  This can be particularly 
problematic when the customary practice standard appears to be too low. 
¶13  An illustration of when customary medical standards are indeed 
too low was seen in Helling v. Carey.35  In Helling, the plaintiff could 
have retained her eyesight had the defendant physician detected her 
condition by administering a simple glaucoma test and taken 
preventative measures.36  Nevertheless, the defendant, an 
ophthalmologist, complied with the standard of his profession, which did 
not require a routine pressure test for persons under forty years of age.37  
Therefore, the defendant acted within the standard of his profession38 
and normally would not have been found negligent.  However, the 
Helling court stated that “it is the duty of the courts to say what is 
required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging results of 
glaucoma,”39 thereby shifting from implementing the traditional 
customary practice standard to  the reasonable prudence standard. Under 
the reasonable prudence standard the defendant was negligent as a matter 
of law.40 Helling highlights how a court had to deviate from the 
customary practice standard in order to prevent the low customary 
standard from shielding a negligent physician.   
¶14 Third, many physicians who participate in providing expert 
testimony are “driven solely by financial reward and not the pursuit of 
sound medical principles.”41 Such financial motives are likely to 
influence an expert’s testimony and create incentives for deliberate or 
subconscious biases and distortions of facts.42    
¶15 Fourth, clinical research evidence (evidence-based medicine)   
proves that customary standards are inefficient. A report from the 1980s 
showed that only fifteen percent of medical practices were based on 
clinical trials.43 Meanwhile, clinical trials have proven that some of the 
common practices used by physicians are ineffective.44  Without solid 
                                                     
34 HAVIGHURST , supra note 4, at 1001. 
35 Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). 
36 Id. at 981–82. 
37 Id.  at 982. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 983. 
40 Id. at 984. 
41 David B. Brown & O. William Brown, The Expert Medical Witness in the 
State of Michigan: A Cause For Concern, 9 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW  279, 286 
(2005). 
42 Mello, supra note 2, at 824. 
43 David Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified Approach, 21 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 1, 10 (2005). 
44 Id. 
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evidence for many customary practices,45 doctors continue to perform 
inefficient treatment.  
¶16 Applying a Daubert analysis resolves many of the weaknesses 
with the traditional customs standard. It ensures that expert opinion is 
grounded in scientifically sound principles and methodologies.  
Published research suggests the finding is methodologically sound 
because the work has “weathered peer review.”46  Judges and juries will 
only hear evidence that the medical community considers real science.  
This means that a so-called expert cannot testify as to what he suspects 
the community is doing based on the expert’s experience, notions, and 
feelings.  Instead, applying Daubert means the expert is well informed 
on research evidence regarding the issue in question. Being informed on 
these matters makes sense in a world where increasing developments in 
technology provide increasing amounts of information and research, 
helping to determine whether medical treatments are safe and efficient.  
Therefore, evidence-based medicine creates compelling reasons for 
experts to testify to the science of a medical treatment rather than to what 
the experts suspects the customary treatment is. Testimonies on the 
science means physicians cannot be found non-negligent just because 
they hid behind customary standards when research shows that the 
treatment in question is harmful or ineffective.  
III. APPLYING DAUBERT TO THE STANDARD OF CARE  
¶17   There appear to be two specific ways of applying Daubert to 
the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. It can either exclude 
expert opinion grounded on incorrect factual assumptions, or it can be 
used to ensure that the expert’s opinion regarding the standard of care is 
based on valid science.  
¶18 First, Daubert can be used to withhold expert opinion that is 
based on incorrect factual assumptions as seen in Berk v. St. Vincent’s 
Hospital and Medical Center.47  In Berk, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant was negligent for not advising him to seek immediate medical 
attention after the plaintiff called the defendant physician and informed 
the physician of orange fluid that was draining out of the plaintiff’s knee 
after surgery.48  The plaintiff’s expert’s opinion was premised on the 
belief that the plaintiff complained to the defendant of redness, swelling, 
and drainage, however the plaintiff stated that he only complained to 
                                                     
45 Id. 
46 Mello, supra note 2, at 857. 
47 Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d 334, 353 (D.N.Y. 
2005). 
48 Id. at 339. 
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defendant of orange drainage.49  Because the plaintiff’s expert’s 
testimony was formulated around inaccurate facts, it failed to meet the 
reliability prong of Daubert and was excludable.50  
¶19 Second, Daubert can be used to ensure that the expert’s 
testimony is methodologically sound as seen in the lower court’s 
decision in Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn, P.C.51 
In Dickenson, the plaintiff underwent heart bypass surgery followed by 
postoperative respiratory care.52 After removal of her ventilation tube, 
the plaintiff suffered brain damage due to insufficient oxygen.53 The 
plaintiff’s estate alleged the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by premature 
removal of the ventilation tube following surgery.54  After applying a 
Daubert analysis, the district court rejected a cardiac surgeon’s testimony 
on the standard of care for extubation of a ventilating tube, which is 
typically performed by a pulmonologist.  The district court noted that: (1) 
the expert knew very little about ventilating medical equipment and the 
settings to be used; (2) the expert had never written an article on 
pulmonology; (3) the expert could not identify any articles about 
pulmonology that he had read; and (4) there was no peer review of his 
opinion regarding defendant’s negligence.55  Therefore, the court applied 
Daubert in order to consider whether the expert’s testimony was 
grounded in reliable science before permitting him to speak on what the 
standard of care is.   
¶20 While ensuring that the expert’s opinion regarding the standard 
of care is based on valid science, a Daubert analysis also remains 
flexible enough to permit testimony that is not explicitly supported by 
texts.  For instance, the court in Sullivan v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy56 
questioned whether the texts used to support an expert’s testimony 
needed to state the precise type of harm explained by the expert. 57 In 
Sullivan, the plaintiff found a hole in her back after she had surgery that 
removed breast cancer and reconstructed her breast.58 The reconstructive 
surgery lasted over thirteen hours.59  The plaintiff’s expert testified that, 
                                                     
49 Id. at 353. 
50 Id. at n. 25. 
51 Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976 
passim (6th Cir. 2004).  
52 Id. at 977–78. 
53 Id.   
54 Id. 
55 Id. at  979–80. 
56 365 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2004). 
57  Id. at 834. 
58 Id. at 829–30. 
59 Id.  
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normally, such reconstruction takes three to four hours to perform60 and 
that “the excessive length of the surgery increased the risk of infection by 
at least six times.”61  The expert deduced that the defendant’s 
performance was below the standard of care because the reconstructive 
surgery lasted drastically longer than usual.62  The trial court felt that the 
expert did not present the steps she used to reach her conclusion and that 
literature describing the effect of operative length on the incidence of 
surgical wound infections was not the same as the effect of operative 
length on the incidence of surgical drain infections.63 As a result, the trial 
court found that the plaintiff’s scientific literature did not support the 
expert’s opinion.64  
¶21 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the trial court in Sullivan.65 
The court stated that textbooks cannot be expected to say what the 
probable increase in the risk of infection is in specific cases; experts’ 
experience suggests those estimates.66  For the district court to require 
texts to state the precise type of harm explained by the testimony of a 
medical expert is an abuse of discretion.67  Therefore, applying Daubert 
does not mean experts must find data that specifically corroborates their 
testimony.  Instead, there remains room for experts to supplant their 
testimony with their own experience.  
IV. DIVIDED COURTS: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A DAUBERT 
COURT AND A CUSTOMARY STANDARD COURT 
¶22 Despite the emergence of new technologies permitting scientific 
methods to help determine the standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases, only two circuits and one state court have addressed the issue.  In 
Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit embraced a Daubert analysis when 
determining the standard of care.68 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit rejected 
such use of Daubert in Dickenson.69 The trial court in Massachusetts 
adopted a Daubert analysis, but the Appeals Court and the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts then rejected applying Daubert to the standard of 
care.  The cases convey why new technologies could change how we 
                                                     
60 Id. at 830. 
61 Id. at 831. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 832. 
65 Id. at 829. 
66 Id. at 834. 
67 Id.  
68 See supra text accompanying notes 56–66. 
69 Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976, 
982 (6th Cir. 2004); see supra text accompanying notes 52–55 (discussing 
district court’s reasons for excluding expert’s testimony). 
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traditionally determine the standard of care.  Moreover, these cases 
highlight the differences between a court applying Daubert and those 
maintaining the traditional standard of care.  
¶23 Although the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court applied an 
excessively rigid Daubert analysis in Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit still 
embraced applying Daubert to the standard of care.70  Moreover, the 
Ninth Circuit suggested that the expert’s testimony should be admitted 
because the opinion met the relevance and reliability prong of Daubert.71   
¶24 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit rejected the use of 
Daubert to determine the standard of care. In Dickenson, the Sixth 
Circuit stated Daubert’s role of excluding junk science from courts is not 
served by excluding testimony from a practitioner with extensive 
relevant experience.72 It is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit altogether 
rejects Daubert or just believes the district court inappropriately applied 
the test.  However, there are reasons to suspect the court altogether 
rejects applying Daubert to the standard of care.  Although the court 
mentions that the physician has extensive relevant experience, that is not 
the same as the relevance of his or her testimony (one of the Daubert 
prongs).  For example, a cardiac surgeon may have relevant experience 
in extubation, but if he testifies about boat manufacturing in a medical 
malpractice claim, his testimony would not be relevant to the issue at 
hand and therefore excludable.  Because the Sixth Circuit does not 
explicitly discuss and analyze the relevance or reliability of an expert’s 
testimony, it appears as though the court altogether rejects the district 
court’s Daubert analysis.  
¶25 Palandjian v. Foster73 was also a case where a higher court 
overturned the application of a Daubert analysis to the standard of care.74  
In Palandjian, the plaintiff died from gastric cancer and his estate filed a 
claim for medical malpractice against defendant physician and 
radiologists.75  The decedent’s grandmother and paternal aunt had also 
died from gastric cancer.76  In order for plaintiff’s expert to testify that 
there is an increased risk of gastric cancer in patients with two or more 
second degree relatives who also had gastric cancer, the plaintiff’s expert 
had to provide Daubert-type evidence to support the statement.77  In the 
lower court, the plaintiffonly provided data to support the controversial 
                                                     
70 Sullivan, 365 F.3d at 833. 
71 Id. 
72 Dickenson, 388 F.3d at 982. 
73 842 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 2006). 
74 Id. at 925. 
75 Id. at 918.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 919–20. 
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belief that patients with a family history of gastric cancer among first 
degree relatives face an increased risk of gastric cancer.78  Failing to 
meet the Daubert standard, the supreme judicial court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to exclude the evidence. 79  
¶26 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Palandjian vacated the 
judgment against the physician after holding that the trial judge erred in 
excluding the expert's opinion.80   According to the Appeals Court, the 
expert’s opinion only applied to the standard of care by suggesting that 
physicians exercise increased caution when dealing with a family history 
of gastric cancer.81  Therefore, it was not the type of scientific evidence 
that must be screened for reliability by a judge.82 The Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts agreed and maintained that the standard of care is 
determined by the care customarily provided by other physicians and that 
it does not have to be scientifically tested or proven effective.83   
¶27 Without a Daubert analysis, the higher courts in Dickenson and 
Palandjian accepted expert testimony because the opinions were based 
on the experts’ knowledge of care provided by other qualified 
physicians.  This means a court applying the traditional standard of care 
is less interested in the methodology underlying the expert’s opinion and 
more interested in the experience and education of the expert. Without 
applying Daubert in Dickenson, a cardiac surgeon became an expert on 
pulmonology because of the physician’s experience working with 
pulmonoligsts, even though the expert had little knowledge about 
ventilating medical equipment, could not identify articles about 
pulmonology which he had read, and had no peer review regarding his 
opinion on defendant’s negligence.  In other words, without the court 
applying Daubert, a cardiac surgeon suddenly became an expert on 
pulmonology.  Additionally, without a Daubert analysis, Palandjian 
suggests an expert can testify that there is an increased risk of gastric 
cancer in patients with two or more second degree relatives who also had 
the disease even though the expert has no evidence to support his 
opinion.  These are precisely the results a Daubert analysis would not 
permit.  Instead, applying Daubert to the standard of care means the 
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80 Id. at 918. 
81 Id. at 920. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 921. 
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expert’s testimony must be underlined with valid scientific theory or 
research.84   
V. DAUBERT AND THE REASONABLE PHYSICIAN STANDARD 
¶28 Applying Daubert to an expert’s testimony on the standard of 
care does not conflict with the increasing shift from a custom-based 
standard to a reasonable physician standard.  Recently, over forty percent 
of states have moved from the customary standard to a reasonable 
physician standard of care.85  The reasonable physician standard is 
applied by determining what the ordinary reasonable physician would do 
under the circumstances.86  Custom is just one bit of evidence 
considered, but it is not dispositive.87  Ultimately, the inquiry for the jury 
is whether the defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent 
physician.88  Therefore, unlike the traditional standard of care, this 
standard leaves room for considering whether the rendered medical care 
was scientifically valid.  
¶29 The reasonable standard of care was applied in Hood v. 
Phillips.89  In Hood, the defendant physician performed carotid surgery 
as treatment for the plaintiff with emphysema. The plaintiff’s experts 
testified that such surgery was an unaccepted method of treatment, a 
treatment with no support from medical evidence, and a treatment 
already shown to be ineffective and abandoned by other physicians.90  
The court determined that the standard of care is what a reasonable and 
prudent member of the medical profession would have done in the same 
or similar circumstances.91  This reasonable and prudent standard permits 
physicians the ability to experiment in medical science by utilizing 
experimental, out-moded, and rejected surgical procedures as a last resort 
if other physicians in a similar circumstance would do the same.92 
Therefore, the reasonable physician standard differs from the customary 
standard because it asks what a reasonable physician would do rather 
than simply asking what is customarily done. (Although, in some 
circumstance a reasonable physician may be a physician that follows 
                                                     
84  Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., P.C., 388 F.3d 976, 
978–80 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that the district court rejected the expert’s 
testimony because he did not consult medical articles when deriving an opinion). 
85 Philip G. Peters Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice 
Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 184 (2000). 
86  Sweeney, supra note 33, at 525–26. 
87 Id. 
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custom.)  This means physicians who follow the pack are not necessarily 
immunized from negligence liability.  
¶30 A Daubert analysis can be applied in states using a reasonable 
physician standard because such states require the plaintiff's expert to 
testify about what other reasonable doctors in a similar circumstance 
would have done.93  Similar to the customary standard, the expert can 
either devise his opinion based on his own notions and feelings or his 
testimony can actually be grounded in scientific evidence.  The Daubert 
analysis is for the purposes of ensuring the scientific basis of an expert’s 
underlying testimony is valid.  If based on legitimate science, the 
expert’s testimony will pass the Daubert test.  Once the expert’s 
testimony passes the Daubert test, the expert can testify as to what a 
reasonable physician would have done.   
VI. WHY APPLYING DAUBERT DOES NOT MAKE THE STANDARD OF 
CARE TOO DEMANDING  
¶31 Although physicians may be concerned that applying Daubert 
will cause the standard of care to be unreasonably demanding, there are 
several factors to remember.  First, under Daubert, a physician’s 
experience is still taken into account. Second, customs are also factored 
into a Daubert analysis. Third, physicians are not held accountable for 
information that was unknown at the time of the alleged negligence. 
¶32 First, a physician’s experience will still be considered when 
determining an expert’s qualifications. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has 
been interpreted to mean: “(1) the expert must be qualified to testify, by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the testimony 
must concern scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge; and 
(3) the testimony must be such as to assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”94 Therefore, the rule for 
expert admissibility expresses that an expert may qualify on the basis of 
experience.  For example, in Regions Bank v. Hagaman95 expert 
testimony was accepted even though the expert's opinion was not 
specifically supported by articles because the expert’s outstanding 
credentials were a factor favoring admissibility.96 If the hesitancy in 
applying Daubert is that it will reject testimony from highly skilled 
physicians, then Federal Rule of Evidence 702 mitigates that fear. This is 
an important feature of the Daubert rule because both the Sixth Circuit 
and the Paladjian court were opposed to rejecting expert witnesses after 
                                                     
93 Sweeney, supra note 33, at 522. 
94 Perez-Viera v. United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15841, at *4 (D.P.R. 
Aug. 11, 2004) (citing United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
95 84 S.W.3d 66 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). 
96 Id. at  70. 
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considering their lengthy experiences (even though they had no scientific 
evidence to back up their statements).   
¶33 Second, customary practice is also considered in a Daubert 
analysis. The Palandjian court stated it is difficult to imagine how 
Daubert, “with its emphasis on methodology, would apply to testimony 
concerning the standard of care. Because the standard of care is 
determined by the care that the average qualified physician would 
provide, it is ‘generally accepted’ almost by definition.”97  In other 
words, the court must think that by definition customary practice is 
“generally accepted” under a Daubert analysis.  Although the reasoning 
is valid, the statement highlights the court’s misunderstanding of the 
difference between the Frye test and the Daubert rule.  
¶34 The Frye decision focused on general acceptance in the scientific 
community as the sole criterion for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence.98 Under Frye, customary practice would be substantially 
similar if not the same as general acceptance.  However, Frye was 
superseded by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which was interpreted in 
Daubert.  Under Daubert, several factors are weighed to determine the 
validity of the science such as: the ability to test the opinion; peer review 
and publication; and potential rate of error.99 It is important to note that 
general acceptance is also one of the several factors that can be used.100  
As the Dickenson court points out, custom is by definition generally 
accepted and since general acceptance is part of the Daubert analysis, 
then by definition, custom is also part of a Daubert analysis. 
¶35 Third, a Daubert analysis only holds physicians accountable for 
information that was known at the time of the alleged negligence. For 
instance, in Palandjian, expert testimony referred to an article published 
over ten years after the alleged negligence.101  The court stated, “a 
physician cannot be held to a standard of care based on medical research 
and literature not in existence at the time of the alleged negligence.”102 
Moreover, if the concern is that physicians will have to stay well 
informed about new research and medical information, one must 
remember that the customs standard is also not a stagnant standard. 
Further, it is not unreasonable to expect physicians, who are 
professionals, to stay well informed about new medical information. 
                                                     
97 Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 924 n.12 (Mass. 2006).  
98 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
99 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
100 Id. 
101 Palandjian, 842 N.E.2d at 926.  
102 Id.     
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CONCLUSION 
¶36 Because new technologies are quickly improving our 
understanding of science and medicine, physicians should be held to a 
standard of care that utilizes this new wave of scientific evidence.  
Rather than relying on customary practice, medical malpractice cases 
should question whether the physician practiced in a way that is 
consistent with legitimate science.  The Daubert rule reaches this 
question by ensuring an expert’s opinion is grounded in valid science 
before the expert can testify as to what the standard of care is.  The effect 
is that medical malpractice no longer rests on what physicians do, but 
instead assess whether a physician acted in accordance with valid science 
and good medicine. 
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